They were like bank deposits only better. They were issued and traded by only the largest and most respectable banks. Their interest rate was regularly reset through a dutch auction. In February 2008 the auctions failed — all the banks pulled out — and investors (like me) got stuck holding worthless paper. Eventually, after much huffing and puffing, some of us (including me) got our money back. But many didn’t. And are still holding worthless paper.<\/p>\n
Their new guise is called Variable Rate Interests bonds. Their interest is tied to LIBOR. My friend says interest rates are going up, so this is a good place to stash spare cash. His financial adviser is recommending them. I asked my friend to ask a little about the bonds’ provenance. Here, word for word, is the financial adviser’s response:<\/p>\n
The issuers that I sent you were JP Morgan Chase, CitiGroup, Bank of America, Wells Fargo. I do not put them in the category of fly by night companies! They are the issuers and backers of the bonds.<\/p>\n
The bonds have a maturity date so the only way Guido comes looking for dear old Don is if Citi, BofA, Wells, or Chase go belly up! They are all investment grade credit issuers.<\/p>\n
The bonds still have a small coupon so they would pay that interest if LIBOR went to zero and would pay the face amount at maturity.<\/p>\n
I hope that answers your question Sir.<\/p>\n
Do I need to offer my comments?<\/p>\n
You can now earn 40% on your money in Argentina\u00a0<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n My father once earned 14% on his money in Mexico — until the Peso collapsed.<\/p>\n Today you can earn 16.5% on your money in Turkey. But after the hike, the Turkish lira dropped 5%.<\/p>\n The Argentinian peso has recently dropped by more than 20%.<\/p>\n What you gain on the one hand, you more than lose with the other.<\/p>\n Don’t put your money overseas.<\/p>\n Missing a Panic<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n My friend Ed said I missed one panic yesterday. The Panic of 1907.<\/p>\n I went to Wikipedia<\/em> and found fascinating stuff.<\/p>\n Note: This “fascinating stuff” is long, but worth boning up on those halcyon days of investing — before the Fed Reserve. There are lessons here.<\/p>\n What emerges from this history is the standard stuff of panics — Too much borrowing to finance too many insanely risky bad debts, leading to panic that the system won’t survive and all our money will be worthless. Panics can spiral out of control. Confidence is fragile.<\/p>\n The\u00a0Panic of 1907<\/b>\u00a0\u2013 also known as the\u00a01907 Bankers’ Panic<\/b>\u00a0or\u00a0Knickerbocker Crisis<\/b>[1]<\/a><\/sup>\u00a0\u2013 was a United States\u00a0financial crisis<\/a>\u00a0that took place over a three-week period starting in mid-October, when the\u00a0New York Stock Exchange<\/a>\u00a0fell almost 50% from its peak the previous year. Panic occurred, as this was during a time of economic\u00a0recession<\/a>, and there were numerous\u00a0runs on banks<\/a>\u00a0and\u00a0trust companies<\/a>. The 1907 panic eventually spread throughout the nation when many state and local banks and businesses entered\u00a0bankruptcy<\/a>. Primary causes of the run included a retraction of\u00a0market liquidity<\/a>\u00a0by a number of New York City banks and a loss of confidence among\u00a0depositors<\/a>, exacerbated by unregulated\u00a0side bets<\/a>\u00a0at\u00a0bucket shops<\/a>.[2]<\/a><\/sup>\u00a0The panic was triggered by the failed attempt in October 1907 to\u00a0corner the market<\/a>\u00a0on\u00a0stock<\/a>\u00a0of the\u00a0United Copper Company<\/a>. When this bid failed, banks that had lent money to the cornering scheme suffered runs that later spread to affiliated banks and trusts, leading a week later to the downfall of the\u00a0Knickerbocker Trust Company<\/a>\u2014New York City’s third-largest trust. The collapse of the Knickerbocker spread fear throughout the city’s trusts as\u00a0regional banks<\/a>\u00a0withdrew\u00a0reserves<\/a>\u00a0from New York City banks. Panic extended across the nation as vast numbers of people withdrew deposits from their regional banks.<\/p>\n The panic might have deepened if not for the intervention of financier\u00a0J. P. Morgan<\/a>,[3]<\/a><\/sup>\u00a0who pledged large sums of his own money, and convinced other New York bankers to do the same, to shore up the\u00a0banking system<\/a>. This highlighted the impotence of the nation’s\u00a0Independent Treasury<\/a>\u00a0system, which managed the nation’s\u00a0money supply<\/a>, yet was unable to inject liquidity back into the market. By November, the\u00a0financial contagion<\/a>\u00a0had largely ended, only to be replaced by a further crisis. This was due to the heavy borrowing of a large brokerage firm that used the stock of\u00a0Tennessee Coal, Iron and Railroad Company<\/a>\u00a0(TC&I) as\u00a0collateral<\/a>. Collapse of TC&I’s stock price was averted by an emergency takeover by Morgan’s\u00a0U.S. Steel Corporation<\/a>\u2014a move approved by\u00a0anti-monopolist<\/a>\u00a0president\u00a0Theodore Roosevelt<\/a>. The following year, Senator\u00a0Nelson W. Aldrich<\/a>, father-in-law of John D. Rockefeller, Jr., established and chaired a commission to investigate the crisis and propose future solutions, leading to the creation of the\u00a0Federal Reserve System<\/a>.[4]<\/a><\/sup>[5]<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n<\/div>\n When United States President\u00a0Andrew Jackson<\/a>\u00a0allowed the charter of the\u00a0Second Bank of the United States<\/a>\u00a0to expire in 1836, the U.S. was without any sort of\u00a0central bank<\/a>, and the\u00a0money supply<\/a>\u00a0in New York City fluctuated with the country’s annual agricultural cycle. Each autumn money flowed out of the city as harvests were purchased and\u2014in an effort to attract money back\u2014interest rates<\/a>\u00a0were raised. Foreign investors then sent their money to New York to take advantage of the higher rates.[6]<\/a><\/sup>\u00a0From the January 1906\u00a0Dow Jones Industrial Average<\/a>\u00a0high of 103, the market began a modest correction that would continue throughout the year. The\u00a0April 1906 earthquake<\/a>\u00a0that devastated San Francisco contributed to the market instability, prompting an even greater flood of money from New York to San Francisco to aid reconstruction.[7]<\/a><\/sup>[8]<\/a><\/sup>\u00a0A further stress on the money supply occurred in late 1906, when the\u00a0Bank of England<\/a>\u00a0raised its interest rates, partly in response to UK insurance companies paying out so much to US policyholders, and more funds remained in London than expected.[9]<\/a><\/sup>\u00a0From their peak in January, stock prices declined 18% by July 1906. By late September, stocks had recovered about half of their losses.<\/p>\n The\u00a0Hepburn Act<\/a>, which gave the\u00a0Interstate Commerce Commission<\/a>\u00a0(ICC) the power to set maximum railroad rates, became law in July 1906.[10]<\/a><\/sup>\u00a0This depreciated the value of railroad securities.[11]<\/a><\/sup>\u00a0Between September 1906 and March 1907, the stock market slid, losing 7.7% of its\u00a0capitalization<\/a>.[12]<\/a><\/sup>\u00a0Between March 9 and 26, stocks fell a further 9.8%.[13]<\/a><\/sup>\u00a0(This March collapse is sometimes referred to as a “rich man’s panic”.)[14]<\/a><\/sup>\u00a0The economy remained volatile through the summer. A number of shocks hit the system: the stock of\u00a0Union Pacific<\/a>\u2014among the most common stocks used as\u00a0collateral<\/a>\u2014fell 50 points; that June an offering of New York City\u00a0bonds<\/a>\u00a0failed; in July the\u00a0copper<\/a>\u00a0market collapsed; in August the\u00a0Standard Oil Company<\/a>\u00a0was fined $29 million for\u00a0antitrust<\/a>violations.[14]<\/a><\/sup>\u00a0In the first nine months of 1907, stocks were lower by 24.4%.[15]<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n On July 27,\u00a0The Commercial & Financial Chronicle<\/a><\/i>\u00a0noted that “the market keeps unstable\u00a0… no sooner are these signs of new life in evidence than something like a suggestion of a new outflow of gold to Paris sends a tremble all through the list, and the gain in values and hope is gone”.[16]<\/a><\/sup>\u00a0Several\u00a0bank runs<\/a>\u00a0occurred outside the US in 1907: in Egypt in April and May; in Japan in May and June; in Hamburg and Chile in early October.[10]<\/a><\/sup>\u00a0The fall season was always a vulnerable time for the banking system\u2014combined with the roiled stock market, even a small shock could have grave repercussions.[9]<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n The 1907 panic began with a\u00a0stock manipulation<\/a>\u00a0scheme to\u00a0corner the market<\/a>\u00a0in\u00a0F. Augustus Heinze<\/a>‘s\u00a0United Copper Company<\/a>. Heinze had made a fortune as a\u00a0copper<\/a>\u00a0magnate in\u00a0Butte, Montana<\/a>. In 1906 he moved to New York City, where he formed a close relationship with notorious\u00a0Wall Street<\/a>\u00a0banker\u00a0Charles W. Morse<\/a>. Morse had once successfully cornered New York City’s\u00a0ice market<\/a>, and together with Heinze gained control of many banks\u2014the pair served on at least six\u00a0national banks<\/a>, ten\u00a0state banks<\/a>, five\u00a0trust companies<\/a>\u00a0and four\u00a0insurance<\/a>\u00a0firms.[17]<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n Augustus’ brother, Otto, devised the scheme to corner United Copper, believing that the Heinze family already controlled a majority of the company. He also believed that a significant number of the Heinze’s\u00a0shares<\/a>\u00a0had been\u00a0borrowed<\/a>, and\u00a0sold short<\/a>, by speculators betting that the stock price would drop, and that they could thus repurchase the borrowed shares cheaply, pocketing the difference. Otto proposed a\u00a0short squeeze<\/a>, whereby the Heinzes would aggressively purchase as many remaining shares as possible, and then force the short sellers to pay for their borrowed shares. The aggressive purchasing would drive up the share price, and, being unable to find shares elsewhere, the short sellers would have no option but to turn to the Heinzes, who could then name their price.[18]<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n To finance the scheme, Otto, Augustus and Charles Morse met with\u00a0Charles T. Barney<\/a>, president of the city’s third-largest trust, the\u00a0Knickerbocker Trust Company<\/a>. Barney had provided financing for previous Morse schemes. Morse, however, cautioned Otto that in order to attempt the squeeze, Otto needed much more money than Barney had, and Barney declined to provide funding.[19]<\/a><\/sup>\u00a0Otto decided to attempt the corner anyway. On Monday, October 14, he began aggressively purchasing shares of United Copper, which rose in one day from $39 to $52 per share. On Tuesday (Oct. 15), he issued the call for short sellers to return the borrowed stock. The share price rose to nearly $60, but the short sellers were able to find plenty of United Copper shares from sources other than the Heinzes. Otto had misread the market, and the share price of United Copper began to collapse.[20]<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n The stock closed at $30 on Tuesday and fell to $10 by Wednesday (Oct. 16). Otto Heinze was ruined. The stock of United Copper was traded outside the hall of the\u00a0New York Stock Exchange<\/a>, literally an outdoor market “on the curb” (this curb market would later become the\u00a0American Stock Exchange<\/a>). After the crash,\u00a0The Wall Street Journal<\/a><\/i>\u00a0reported, “Never has there been such wild scenes on the Curb, so say the oldest veterans of the outside market”.[21]<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n The failure of the corner left Otto unable to meet his obligations and sent his brokerage house, Gross & Kleeberg, into bankruptcy. On Thursday, October 17, the New York Stock Exchange suspended Otto’s trading privileges. As a result of United Copper’s collapse, the State Savings Bank of Butte Montana (owned by F. Augustus Heinze) announced its insolvency. The Montana bank had held United Copper stock as\u00a0collateral<\/a>\u00a0against some of its lending and had been a\u00a0correspondent bank<\/a>\u00a0for the\u00a0Mercantile National Bank<\/a>\u00a0in New York City, of which F. Augustus Heinze was then president.<\/p>\n F. Augustus Heinze’s association with the corner and the insolvent State Savings Bank proved too much for the board of the Mercantile to accept. Although they forced him to resign before lunch time,[22]<\/a><\/sup>\u00a0by then it was too late. As news of the collapse spread, depositors rushed\u00a0en masse<\/i>\u00a0to withdraw money from the Mercantile National Bank. The Mercantile had enough capital to withstand a few days of withdrawals, but depositors began to pull cash from the banks of the Heinzes’ associate Charles W. Morse. Runs occurred at Morse’s National Bank of North America and the New Amsterdam National. Afraid of the impact the tainted reputations of Augustus Heinze and Morse could have on the banking system, the\u00a0New York Clearing House<\/a>\u00a0(a consortium of the city’s banks) forced Morse and Heinze to resign all banking interests.[23]<\/a><\/sup>\u00a0By the weekend after the failed corner, there was not yet systemic panic. Funds were withdrawn from Heinze-associated banks, only to be deposited with other banks in the city.[24]<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n A week later many regional stock exchanges throughout the nation were closing or limiting trading. For example, the\u00a0Pittsburgh<\/a>\u00a0city’s\u00a0stock exchange<\/a>\u00a0closed for three months starting on October 23, 1907.[25]<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n Because of past association with Charles W. Morse and F. Augustus Heinze, on Monday, October 21, the board of the Knickerbocker asked that Barney resign (depositors may have first begun to pull deposits from the Knickerbocker on October 18, prompting the concern).[24]<\/a><\/sup>\u00a0That day, the\u00a0National Bank of Commerce<\/a>\u00a0where J.P. Morgan was a dominant factor, announced it would not serve as\u00a0clearing house<\/a>\u00a0for the Knickerbocker. On October 22, the Knickerbocker faced a classic bank run. From the bank’s opening, the crowd grew. As\u00a0The New York Times<\/a><\/i>\u00a0reported, “as fast as a depositor went out of the place ten people and more came asking for their money [and the police] were asked to send some men to keep order”.[28]<\/a><\/sup>\u00a0Two van loads of notes were quickly unloaded, yet even this failed to calm the panic stricken depositors. Directors and other officials of the Trust forced their way through the crowd, assuring them that everyone would be paid.[29]<\/a><\/sup>\u00a0In less than three hours, $8 million was withdrawn from the Knickerbocker. Shortly after noon it was forced to suspend operations.[24]<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n As news spread, other banks and trust companies were reluctant to lend any money. The interest rates on loans to brokers at the stock exchange soared to 70% and, with brokers unable to get money, stock prices fell to a low not seen since December 1900.[30]<\/a><\/sup>\u00a0The panic quickly spread to two other large trusts, Trust Company of America and Lincoln Trust Company. By Thursday, October 24, a chain of failures littered the street: Twelfth Ward Bank, Empire City Savings Bank, Hamilton Bank of New York, First National Bank of Brooklyn, International Trust Company of New York, Williamsburg Trust Company of Brooklyn, Borough Bank of Brooklyn, Jenkins Trust Company of Brooklyn and the Union Trust Company of Providence.[31]<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n When the chaos began to shake the confidence of New York’s banks, the city’s most famous banker was out of town.\u00a0J. P. Morgan<\/a>, the eponymous president of\u00a0J.P. Morgan & Co.<\/a>, was attending a church convention in\u00a0Richmond, Virginia<\/a>. Morgan was not only the city’s wealthiest and most well-connected banker, but he had experience with other similar financial crises\u2014he had helped rescue the\u00a0U.S. Treasury<\/a>\u00a0during the\u00a0Panic of 1893<\/a>. As news of the crisis gathered, Morgan returned to Wall Street from his convention late on the night of Saturday, October 19. The following morning, the\u00a0library<\/a>\u00a0of Morgan’s\u00a0brownstone<\/a>\u00a0at Madison Avenue and 36th St. had become a revolving door of New York City bank and trust company presidents arriving to share information about (and seek help surviving) the impending crisis.[32]<\/a><\/sup>[33]<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n Morgan and his associates examined the books of the Knickerbocker Trust, and decided it was insolvent so did not intervene to stop the run. Its failure, however, triggered runs on even healthy trusts, prompting Morgan to take charge of the rescue operation. On the afternoon of Tuesday, October 22, the president of the Trust Company of America asked Morgan for assistance. That evening Morgan conferred with\u00a0George F. Baker<\/a>, the president of First National Bank,\u00a0James Stillman<\/a>\u00a0of the National City Bank of New York (the ancestor of\u00a0Citibank<\/a>), and the\u00a0United States Secretary of the Treasury<\/a>,\u00a0George B. Cortelyou<\/a>. Cortelyou said that he was ready to deposit government money in the banks to help shore up their deposits. After an overnight audit of the Trust Company of America showed the institution to be sound, on Wednesday afternoon Morgan declared, “This is the place to stop the trouble, then.”[34]<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n As a run began on the Trust Company of America, Morgan worked with Stillman and Baker to liquidate the company’s assets to allow the bank to pay depositors. The bank survived to the close of business, but Morgan knew that additional money would be needed to keep it solvent through the following day. That night he assembled the presidents of the other trust companies and held them in a meeting until midnight when they agreed to provide loans of $8.25 million to allow the Trust Company of America to stay open the next day.[35]<\/a><\/sup>\u00a0On Thursday morning Cortelyou deposited around $25 million into a number of New York banks.[36]<\/a><\/sup>\u00a0John D. Rockefeller<\/a>, the wealthiest man in the United States, deposited a further $10 million in Stillman’s National City Bank.[36]<\/a><\/sup>Rockefeller’s massive deposit left the National City Bank with the deepest reserves of any bank in the city. To instill public confidence, Rockefeller phoned\u00a0Melville Stone<\/a>, the manager of the\u00a0Associated Press<\/a>, and told him that he would pledge half of his wealth to maintain U.S. credit.[37]<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n Despite the infusion of cash, the banks of New York were reluctant to make the short-term loans they typically provided to facilitate daily stock trades. Prices on the exchange began to\u00a0crash<\/a>, owing to the lack of funds to finance purchases. At 1:30\u00a0p.m. Thursday, October 24, Ransom Thomas, the president of the\u00a0New York Stock Exchange<\/a>, rushed to Morgan’s offices to tell him that he would have to close the exchange early. Morgan was emphatic that an early close of the exchange would be catastrophic.[38]<\/a><\/sup>[39]<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n Morgan summoned the presidents of the city’s banks to his office. They started to arrive at 2\u00a0p.m.; Morgan informed them that as many as 50 stock exchange houses would fail unless $25 million was raised in 10 minutes. By 2:16\u00a0p.m., 14 bank presidents had pledged $23.6 million to keep the stock exchange afloat. The money reached the market at 2:30\u00a0p.m., in time to finish the day’s trading, and by the 3\u00a0o’clock market close, $19 million had been loaned out. Disaster was averted. Morgan usually eschewed the press, but as he left his offices that night he made a statement to reporters: “If people will keep their money in the banks, everything will be all right”.[40]<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n Friday, however, saw more panic on the exchange. Morgan again approached the bank presidents, but this time was only able to convince them to pledge $9.7 million. In order for this money to keep the exchange open, Morgan decided the money could not be used for\u00a0margin sales<\/a>. The volume of trading on Friday was 2\/3 that of Thursday. The markets again narrowly made it to the closing bell.[41]<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n To ensure a free flow of funds on Monday, the New York Clearing House issued $100 million in loan certificates to be traded between banks to settle balances, allowing them to retain cash reserves for depositors.[45]<\/a><\/sup>\u00a0Reassured both by the clergy and the newspapers, and with bank balance sheets flush with cash, a sense of order returned to New York that Monday.[46]<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n Unbeknownst to Wall Street, a new crisis was being averted in the background. On Sunday, Morgan’s associate,\u00a0George Perkins<\/a>, was informed that the City of New York required at least $20 million by November 1 or it would go bankrupt. The city tried to raise money through a standard bond issue, but failed to gather enough financing. On Monday and again on Tuesday,\u00a0New York Mayor<\/a>\u00a0George McClellan<\/a>\u00a0approached Morgan for assistance. In an effort to avoid the disastrous signal that a New York City bankruptcy would send, Morgan contracted to purchase $30 million worth of city bonds.[47]<\/a><\/sup>[44]<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n Although calm was largely restored in New York by Saturday, November 2, yet another crisis loomed. One of the exchange’s largest brokerage firms,\u00a0Moore & Schley<\/a>, was heavily in debt and in danger of collapse. The firm had borrowed heavily, using shares of the\u00a0Tennessee Coal, Iron and Railroad Company<\/a>\u00a0(TC&I) as collateral. With the value of the thinly traded stock under pressure, many banks would likely call the loans of Moore & Schley on Monday and force an\u00a0en masse<\/i>\u00a0liquidation of the firm’s stock. If that occurred it would send TC&I shares plummeting, devastating Moore and Schley and triggering further panic in the market.[48]<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n To avert the collapse of Moore & Schley, Morgan called an emergency conference at his\u00a0library<\/a>\u00a0Saturday morning. A proposal was made that the\u00a0U.S. Steel Corporation<\/a>, a company Morgan had helped form through the merger of the steel companies of\u00a0Andrew Carnegie<\/a>\u00a0and\u00a0Elbert Gary<\/a>, would acquire TC&I. This would effectively save Moore & Schley and avert the crisis. The executives and board of U.S. Steel studied the situation and offered to either loan Moore & Schley $5 million, or buy TC&I for $90 a share. By 7 p.m. an agreement had not been reached and the meeting adjourned.[49]<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n By then, Morgan was drawn into another situation. There was deep concern that the Trust Company of America and the Lincoln Trust might fail to open on Monday due to continuing runs by depositors. On Saturday evening 40\u201350 bankers had gathered at the library to discuss the crisis, with the clearing-house bank presidents in the East room and the trust company executives in the West room. Morgan and those dealing with the Moore & Schley situation had moved to the librarian’s office. There Morgan told his counselors that he would agree to help shore up Moore & Schley only if the trust companies would work together to bail out their weakest brethren.[50]<\/a><\/sup>\u00a0The discussion among the bankers continued late into Saturday night but without much progress. Around midnight, J. P. Morgan informed a leader of the trust company presidents that keeping Moore & Schley afloat would require $25 million, and he would not commit those funds unless the problems with the trust companies could also be resolved. The trust company executives understood they would not receive further help from Morgan; they would have to finance any bailout of the two struggling trust companies.<\/p>\n At 3 a.m. about 120 bank and trust company officials assembled to hear a full report on the status of the failing trust companies. While the Trust Company of America was barely solvent, the Lincoln Trust Company was probably $1 million short of what it needed to cover depositor accounts. As discussion ensued, the bankers realized that Morgan had locked them in the library and pocketed the key to force a solution,[51]<\/a><\/sup>\u00a0the sort of strong-arm tactic he had been known to use in the past.[52]<\/a><\/sup>\u00a0Morgan then entered the talks and advised the trust companies they must provide a loan of $25 million to save the weaker institutions. The trust presidents were still reluctant to act, but Morgan informed them that if they did not it would lead to a complete collapse of the banking system. Through his considerable influence, at about 4:45\u00a0a.m. he persuaded the unofficial leader of the trust companies to sign the agreement, and the remainder of the bankers followed.[52]<\/a><\/sup>\u00a0Having received these commitments, Morgan allowed the bankers to go home.[53]<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n On Sunday afternoon and into the evening, Morgan, Perkins, Baker and Stillman, along with U.S. Steel’s Gary and\u00a0Henry Clay Frick<\/a>, worked at the library to finalize the deal for U.S. Steel to buy TC&I and by Sunday night had a plan for acquisition. But one obstacle remained: the\u00a0anti-trust<\/a>\u00a0crusading President\u00a0Theodore Roosevelt<\/a>, who had made breaking up\u00a0monopolies<\/a>\u00a0a focus of his presidency.Panic of 1907<\/strong><\/span><\/h3>\n
![\"\"](\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/File:1907_Panic_crop.png\")
<\/a><\/span><\/span><\/p>\nEconomic conditions<\/strong><\/span><\/h3>\n<\/div>\n
<\/a><\/p>\nPanic<\/span><\/strong><\/span><\/h3>\n
\n<\/a>The curb outside the\u00a0New York Stock Exchange<\/a>\u00a0where panic began.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\nContagion spreads<\/span><\/strong><\/h3>\n
Panic hits the trusts<\/span><\/h3>\n
J. P. Morgan<\/span><\/h3>\n
\n<\/a>\u00a0J.P. Morgan<\/a>, the dominant banker in New York City.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\nStock exchange nears collapse<\/span><\/h3>\n
Crisis of confidence<\/span><\/h3>\n
Drama at the library<\/span><\/h3>\n