I’ve\u00a0 become a cover — viz the latest Economist.<\/p>\n
There are millions like me — suffering and scared. Not a good combination for an early uptick in the economy.<\/p>\n I figured gold as a safe haven. No way. I figured high dividend payers like mortgage REITs. No way. They’re being downgraded everywhere. I’m thinking we may be in for a dose of 2008’s declines. Remember that gruesome time? Here’s 15 years of the S&P 500.<\/p>\n Not exactly a pretty picture. Today –– in 2011 — we’re where we were in 1998.<\/strong> And most likely\u00a0 going lower.<\/p>\n I don’t have any answers this morning, except cash, cash and more cash. And lots of words for you to read this morning.<\/p>\n Here’s The Econonomist’s Buttonwood on:<\/p>\n Global economic outlook JUST back from chairing a panel session at an asset allocation conference in London. The lead speaker (and panel member) was Nouriel Roubini (who has inherited the title of Doctor Doom from Henry Kaufman). He outlined the case why he thinks there is a 60% chance of a developed world recession.<\/p>\n With the US economy at what he calls “stall speed” of 1% annualised growth in the first half of the year, it cannot continue in such a state. Either it must reaccelerate or fall into recession. He cited a whole range of factors as to why the second outcome was more likely.<\/p>\n History teaches us that financial crises are followed by anaemic growth and the developed economy is duly following the script. Rapid growth is implausible.<\/p>\n Tail risks are not transitory. Eurozone contagion has been spreading; the US government has almost been shut down by fiscal disputes and the super committee won’t reach agreement; middle East conflict is also hitting more countries.<\/p>\n For the above reasons, the outlook is very uncertain and that increases the “option value” of waiting. Companies defer investment. Economic weakness can become self-fulfilling.<\/p>\n There is a vicious cycle in which bad macroeconomic news drives down asset markets which have an adverse economic impact; notably credit spreads have risen, increasing corporate borrowing costs.<\/p>\n Some recent US data have been encouraging. But that was true of the first quarter, only for growth to be revised lower. Big companies may be fine but surveys of small business sentiment are at depression-style levels.<\/p>\n US consumption has been artificially boosted by tax cuts and transfer payments that may not be repeated in 2012. Without them, the outlook is bleak given the weak labour market, slow wage growth and poor consumer confidence.<\/p>\n The massive increase in wealth inequality has redistributed income from labour to capital and from the poor to rich. This has reduced the marginal propensity to consume.<\/p>\n Policymakers are running out of bullets (an argument also made here). Fiscal stimulus is being replaced by austerity; there is political resistance to bank bailouts; depreciating currencies to gain export share is a zero-sum game; and monetary policy is becoming impotent because QE merely leads to the build-up of excess bank reserves.<\/p>\n He also pretty much dismissed all the eurozone rescue plans as financial engineering. Doctor Doom indeed.<\/p>\n Here’s the Economist’s Leader on Nowhere to Hide<\/strong>:<\/p>\n Investing during a crisis PITY the world\u2019s savers. Economists and other busybodies chide them for not spending more, thereby stimulating the economy. Meanwhile their pension schemes are steadily being made less generous, a process that will require them to save more, not less, if they want to enjoy a comfortable retirement. Britons now retiring on private pensions will receive an income 30% less than those who left work three years ago (see Buttonwood<\/strong><\/a>). When savers try to find a home for their money, they face daily headlines about bank bailouts, sovereign-debt crises and the possibility of another recession.<\/p>\n Given the scale of the risks, investors are not being offered much in the way of reward. In much of the developed world, yields on cash are 1.5% or below. The most liquid government bond markets (those of America, Britain, Germany and Japan) offer yields of 2.5% or less. In both cases, such meagre returns are part of a deliberate policy: governments and central banks want companies that might create jobs to start borrowing again. Even American equities, despite a dismal record over the past decade, offer a dividend yield of just 2.1%, a level that historically has been associated with low returns for several years to come (see article<\/strong><\/a>). That is a legacy of the stratospheric valuations attained by Wall Street at the height of the dotcom bubble.<\/p>\n The danger for savers is not simply of disappointing returns, but of devastating blows to their wealth. Just after the second world war, British government bonds (gilts) offered yields similar to today\u2019s; those who bought them lost three-quarters of their money, in real terms, by 1974. Investors with more of an appetite for risk may do even worse. Those who bought Japanese shares at the peak in 1989 are now sitting on a nominal 80% loss.<\/p>\n Investors\u2019 choices will be guided by how they think the crisis will unfold. The best hope is that the authorities will \u201cmuddle through\u201d: stabilise the European sovereign-debt crisis, steer developed economies back on to a path of 2-3% annual growth while simultaneously devising realistic plans to reduce government debt over the medium term. But if that rosy prospect does not materialise\u2014and the odds are against it\u2014the world is looking at three scenarios.<\/p>\n One possibility is that the developed world will attempt to inflate its debt away, perhaps by ever-larger doses of quantitative easing. A surge in commodity prices in 2010 and early 2011 has pushed inflation higher than it was a year ago in each of the G7 countries, and in Brazil, Russia and China as well (India is the exception among the BRICs). Inflation normally suggests investors should go for gold. But its stratospheric price, and the fact that most economists think that inflation will fall back as the global economy slows, argue against it.<\/p>\n A second possibility is that the European authorities make a fatal miscalculation, allowing Greece to default chaotically, without adequately propping up the region\u2019s banks or protecting bigger economies such as Italy and Spain from collateral damage. The result could be a very sharp fall in European GDP, with knock-on effects in the rest of the rich world. That scenario argues in favour of US Treasuries.<\/p>\n This newspaper persists in believing that Europe\u2019s politicians cannot be stupid enough to allow the euro to collapse; but, like their equally uninspiring peers in America, they are unlikely to do much to help the West\u2019s economies grow. So we suspect that the rich world faces a third scenario: Japanese-style stagnation. Recessions are likely to be more frequent than they were in the 1980s and 1990s, and the overall growth rate sluggish. Such an outcome would make it very difficult for the developed world to work off its debts; more countries would fall into the kind of debt trap faced by Japan.<\/p>\n On the face of it, a gloomy outlook argues for Treasuries. In recessions, they have generally been a good bet, delivering an average positive return of 10.4% while equities have delivered an average negative return of 15.3%. But that depends on negligible inflation; and given that the current American rate is 3.8% and that the average rate since 1900 has been 3.1%, this is a big risk for investors to take. It was inflation that wiped out British gilt-holders after the second world war.<\/p>\n Equities offer a better hedge against inflation, but American shares still look expensive. On a cyclically adjusted price-earnings measure, which smooths profits over ten years, they trade on a multiple of 19.4, compared to a historic average of 16.4. European equities, which have on average underperformed American ones, look more attractive: the price-earnings ratio in the euro zone is 11. But there is a case for holding cash on the ground that things may get worse before they get better.<\/p>\n If markets continue downwards, equities could be a bargain next year; already some companies with global brand names trade on dividend yields of more than 5%. Many big companies are sitting on piles of cash and are benefiting from the continued growth in Asia. A purer bet on emerging markets would be to buy shares in China and India; but Asia will not be immune from a global downturn and their markets are still opaque. At the moment many of the best refuges are to be found in corporate bonds. European high-yield bonds pay 10 percentage points more than government issues, even though default rates are currently very low: in the year to September, only 1.9% of issues defaulted. But, once again, if the economy stalls, even corporate bonds may become cheaper.<\/p>\n It would be better for the global economy if savers piled their cash into equities and corporate bonds now, rather than waiting for better news. But savers are understandably reluctant to buy in the face of political dithering; whether it is Europe\u2019s failure to sort out the Greek crisis or Washington\u2019s failure to devise a plan that combines short-term economic stimulus with a long-term plan to reduce the deficit. That is yet another reason for politicians to get their various acts together: doing so will encourage savers to remove their cash from under their mattresses and put it into productive assets.<\/p>\n Europe is the big overhang.<\/strong><\/span> As politicians dither, markets think of horrid outcomes.<\/p>\n Hopes of a Big Deal in Europe,Followed by Denials<\/strong><\/em> in New York Times. Excerpt:<\/p>\n But even if a deal on the bailout fund is agreed to, any stock market rally might not prove to be permanent, as the realization sank in that the costs could weigh heavily on certain countries for some time to come. That was the case in the autumn of 2008, when American officials struggled to contain the fallout from the demise of Lehman Brothers. Back then, a number of market relief rallies were followed by a continuing decline in stocks.<\/p>\n A fresh reminder of the current crisis\u2019s contagion dangers came on Tuesday, when France rushed to defend its AAA credit rating \u2014 one of the few top ratings left among major Western economies \u2014 after a warning by Moody\u2019s Investors Service that the French government was at risk from the Continent\u2019s widening sovereign debt problems. Mr. Baroin was compelled to go on French television Tuesday to declare the government would \u201cdo everything to avoid being downgraded.\u201d<\/p>\n The price that France pays to borrow on international financial markets compared with Germany surged on Tuesday to its highest level since the euro was introduced in 1999. Rising borrowing costs are what pushed weaker countries, including Greece, Ireland and Portugal, to seek bailouts.<\/p>\n More problems in Italy or Spain would stretch the finances of big countries like France and Germany even further.<\/p>\n While France\u2019s accounts are still in better shape than those of many of its neighbors, they could deteriorate if the government provided significant financing to other European countries or to its own banking system in a bid to keep the euro crisis from spiraling. Such moves could give rise to significant new liabilities for the government\u2019s balance sheet, Moody\u2019s warned.<\/p>\n Real estate with nowhere to hide, also.<\/strong><\/span> Houses. Strip malls. There’s too much of everything for today’s contracting economy.\u00a0 Two items on sale:<\/p>\n CB Richard Ellis represents Federal Trust Bank in the sale of a portfolio of banking center assets in the Greater Orlando area. The portfolio consists of six vacant bank branch properties. Each is\u00a0 available for sale individually or may be purchased together as a portfolio. (But who wants them?) Here’s one of them.<\/p>\n Locations will be sold through a modified, sealed bid process, with no deed restrictions, reserve price or minimum bids.\u00a0 For more, click here.<\/strong><\/a><\/p>\n This is the Penobscot Building in Detroit.<\/p>\n It’s a gorgeous art deco building. It’s one million square feet, in the heart of the Detroit CBD (central business district). This is the lobby.<\/p>\n According to the New York Times ad, “Asking price TBD. .. Tremendous upside potential amidst amidst Detroit’s resurgence<\/strong>.”<\/p>\n Makes my heart warm to read real estate advertising. Gives new meaning to creativity. For more click here.<\/strong><\/a><\/p>\n The good news down in Washington. <\/strong><\/span>Our politicians are not only imcompetent, they’re cheats.\u00a0 Read this:<\/p>\n Capitol Gains<\/strong> In 1995, when Alan Ziobrowski was an associate professor of finance at Lander University, in South Carolina, he found himself at home one night watching \u201cone of those 60 Minutes\u2013type shows.\u201d That evening\u2019s story caught his interest: Gregory Boller, a professor of marketing at the University of Memphis, had found some striking coincidences in which members of Congress, between 1990 and 1995, bought or sold stock in companies that could be affected by ongoing government activity.<\/p>\n According to Boller\u2019s study, which Mother Jones also covered, Senator Lloyd Bentsen (D\u2013Texas) had bought stock in a dairy processor and sold it 10 months later, days before the Justice Department began investigating the company for rigging bids to sell milk in public schools. Senator Bob Dole (R\u2013Kansas) had purchased stock in Automatic Data Processing four days before President George H. W. Bush signed a law with new rules for military data processing. Representative Newt Gingrich (R\u2013Georgia) bought Boeing stock just before he helped kill amendments that would have cut funding for the International Space Station\u2014an outcome that helped Boeing secure a contract.<\/p>\n It all sounded very damning. And yet to Ziobrowski, Boller\u2019s work didn\u2019t seem completely fair. The examples were cherry-picked and could, in fact, have been mere coincidences. How many times, for example, had congressmen sold Lockheed Martin or AT&T right before passing laws that benefited the companies? To know whether members of Congress were turning insider knowledge into personal financial gain, you needed to look at all their trades\u2014those made by the small fry as well as the presidential contenders, the losers as well as the winners. The real question, he thought, was whether a portfolio made up of stocks held by members of Congress would significantly outpace the market.<\/p>\n To find the answer, Ziobrowski recruited three other professors, including his wife, Brigitte, who oversaw the tedious process of actually turning the entries on the opaque disclosure forms into usable data. While the House forms were available in libraries, getting the records from Senate offices proved especially difficult. \u201cWe finally had to buy many of them at 20 cents a page,\u201d Ziobrowski told me. And even after they got the forms, \u201cit took years to go through and track all of those transactions,\u201d Ziobrowski says.<\/p>\n Their results were necessarily approximate. Some members left office before selling shares; others would sell some, but not all, of their stock. \u201cAnd then there are others who just don\u2019t bother to tell you when they sell,\u201d Ziobrowski told me. \u201cYou\u2019ll see the portfolio change, but you don\u2019t know why. There\u2019s no watchdog, there\u2019s no one who audits to check that they\u2019re accurate.\u201d<\/p>\n Even so, the professors eventually had a data set comprising all known senatorial transactions between 1993 and 1998. And what they found shocked Ziobrowski.<\/p>\n \u201cMost of the time, you do studies like this, and you end up concluding that there are no abnormal returns. Call us naive, but the part that bothered me most about Boller\u2019s work is that it suggests that they\u2019re doing something sneaky, but it didn\u2019t actually show that they were doing anything sneaky.\u201d He chuckled. \u201cNone of us were betting our tenure on the results of this study.\u201d<\/p>\n But when they\u2019d completed their analysis, it looked like they\u2014and at least a few members of Congress\u2014had hit the jackpot. Their analysis of the Senate returns over the six-year period, published in the Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis in 2004, showed that the Senate portfolio outperformed the market by approximately 12 percent a year. In April of this year, the team published a follow-up analysis of the House in Business and Politics, which showed that House members on average outperformed the market by a smaller but still impressive figure\u2014roughly 6 percent a year.<\/p>\n These numbers are bigger than they sound. If you took $100 and invested it at 6 percent over a 40-year career, when you retired, that $100 would have increased almost tenfold \u2026 while if your portfolio averaged a steady 12 percent, your original $100 would have turned into more than $8,000. If you\u2019ve looked at your 401(k) recently, you know most people don\u2019t get such returns. And that was just the extra profits they made, over and above the 20 percent annual return that even a blind monkey with a dartboard and an E*Trade account was making back in the late 1990s. A study of corporate insiders, who presumably have lots of information about their firm\u2019s performance, showed that their purchases earned abnormal returns of only about 6 percent a year. Senators seemed to be the greatest stock pickers since Warren Buffett.<\/p>\n But of course, Warren Buffett spends most of his days locked in his office in Omaha, pondering his investments. Senators had to get their stock deals done between rubber-chicken dinners and grip-and-grins at the state fair. Which made it hard to escape the conclusion that they were doing something a little worse than sneaky.<\/p>\n Or were they? A few years ago, after the Center for Responsive Politics made congressional disclosure forms available in an easily searchable data set, two graduate students in Harvard\u2019s political-science department decided to revisit the question for the new millennium. Andrew Eggers and Jens Hainmueller, now assistant professors at the London School of Economics and MIT, respectively, had become interested in the emerging literature on whether politicians benefit financially from holding office, and they were just finishing their first paper, which used probate data to look at that question in the United Kingdom. (Answer: yes, at least if they were Tories in the House of Commons between 1950 and 1970.)<\/p>\n They eagerly attacked the U.S. data. Both of them got a big surprise. Their data, which covered 2004 through 2008, didn\u2019t show Congress outperforming the market by 12 percent. In fact, they didn\u2019t show it outperforming the market at all. For the five years they studied, Congress actually underperformed the market by 2 to 3 percent annually. On average, Congress did worse than an index fund, and about as well as your average stock-picking granny. If Congress was indeed trading on inside information in the late 1990s, it seemed to have stopped.<\/p>\n But, if all the data are right, why would congressional stock-picking have changed so much? That\u2019s \u201cthe one fact that we cannot 100 percent nail down,\u201d says Hainmueller ruefully, especially since Ziobrowski et al. haven\u2019t released their painfully assembled data set. One of the papers could be wrong, of course, but it\u2019s hard to adjudicate that when one group hasn\u2019t released its data and the other\u2019s paper hasn\u2019t yet been published in a peer-reviewed journal\u2014and anyway, neither group is openly disputing the other\u2019s results. Still, Eggers and Hainmueller\u2019s difficulty in explaining the difference may make it harder for them to get their own results published.<\/p>\n One possibility is that insider trading has gotten harder. As a risk-arbitrage trader at Goldman Sachs, former Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin made a living exploiting persistent anomalies between, say, the stock price of a company that was being acquired, and the price that the buyer was offering; now hedge funds are in a technological arms race to gain advantages that last for only milliseconds. Meanwhile, a booming political-intelligence industry scrutinizes Congress like a flock of half-starved vultures. Congressional information advantages may not persist long enough to let members profit from them.<\/p>\n Or perhaps uncovering the behavior changed it. This is the theory that Ziobrowski endorsed when I spoke with him, and it\u2019s quite plausible.<\/p>\n Eggers and Hainmueller also emphasize that the earlier results were driven in large part by a few very heavy traders. To be sure, those traders might have been lucky\u2014and indeed, when you go back and look at the original evidence that sparked Ziobrowski\u2019s research, it\u2019s not quite as lurid as it may first have appeared. Bob Dole\u2019s suspicious trade turns out to have occurred well after Congress had passed the new law that benefited data-processing firms. And while Newt Gingrich may have helped save a program that eventually benefited Boeing, that happened before the contract had been awarded\u2014and since Democrats controlled the House of Representatives, he could hardly count on being able to steer the Space Station business to Boeing.<\/p>\n On the other hand, some of the other trades\u2014such as Bentsen\u2019s dairy deals\u2014still look pretty bad. Perhaps the Senate\u2019s outsized results were driven by a few bad apples who, thankfully, didn\u2019t spoil the rest. When they left Congress, or reformed under the threat of exposure, the excess profits went away.<\/p>\n It\u2019s also possible that congressional insiders could have simply stopped reporting potentially dubious transactions once they knew people were paying attention. According to Ziobrowski, the forms still aren\u2019t audited, and they\u2019re woefully inadequate\u2014for example, Eggers and Hainmueller say there\u2019s no clear method for reporting short-selling, one of the major ways to profit from inside information. This won\u2019t do. We can\u2019t rely on watchdog groups and peer-reviewed papers that take years to get published. By the time we know whether our elected representatives are profiting from their position, it\u2019s old news, and we have a new crop of Congress members to worry about.<\/p>\n Worse still, even if academic gumshoes did work faster, it\u2019s not clear what we could do about congressional insider trading under current law. Ziobrowski et al. may have found evidence of insider trading. But they may not have found evidence of a crime.<\/p>\n That\u2019s because insider trading is a strange offense. It wasn\u2019t even really illegal until the 1930s; before then, insider trading was just assumed, and retail investors mostly aspired to get in on the action. Eighty years later, most people have a strong sense that it should be illegal, but they may have a hard time articulating why. It\u2019s not necessarily obvious who is hurt by insider trading.<\/p>\n Take an insider who buys shares in advance of a merger. Most people intuitively assume that he has defrauded the shares\u2019 sellers, who could have made more money if they\u2019d held on. But of course, they\u2019d already instructed their brokers to sell the stock. If anything, insider trading probably raises the price the sellers got (though in practice, a typical insider probably can\u2019t buy enough to move the price).<\/p>\n Of course, if our insider buys shares, someone else doesn\u2019t get them \u2026 but there\u2019s no way of knowing whether that person would have held on to the stock until the merger was announced. So the insider could possibly profit without making anyone noticeably worse off\u2014indeed, by raising the price closer to the stock\u2019s \u201ctrue\u201d value, he\u2019s actually made the market more efficient. It\u2019s arguably the closest thing that modern finance has to a victimless crime.<\/p>\n The law reflects our confusion about the harm caused by insider trading. Stephen Bainbridge, a law professor at UCLA, says, \u201cThe most widely used theory by SEC and the courts is that [insider trading] undermines investor confidence in the integrity of the markets.\u201d But Bainbridge argues that this doesn\u2019t necessarily make much sense, especially if you look at the current state of the law. In 1980, the Supreme Court ruled that Vincent Chiarella, a printer who had profited from stock trades he made after deducing the identity of the companies involved in merger prospectuses he was printing, was not guilty of insider trading. It takes more than \u201cmaterial nonpublic information\u201d to make you an insider\u2014you also must have a fiduciary duty to keep the information secret. If you overhear two executives in the ladies\u2019 room chatting about an earnings surprise, they may be in trouble, but you are free to use that information however you wish.<\/p>\n Unless it\u2019s the ladies\u2019 room at your employer. Six years after Chiarella v. United States, R. Foster Winans, who wrote The Wall Street Journal\u2019s Heard on the Street column, was convicted on 59 counts of financial fraud for tipping off brokers about the contents before publication. The case was decided by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which ruled that Winans had breached the insider-trading rules even though he had no fiduciary connection to the companies he wrote about. Winans, the Second Circuit ruled, had illegally misappropriated information that belonged to his employer. (Chiarella\u2019s verdict might also have been upheld if he\u2019d been convicted on these grounds, but that argument wasn\u2019t raised at trial.)<\/p>\n Yet Bainbridge notes that in ruling that The Journal had a property right in the contents of its articles, the Second Circuit left open the possibility that The Journal could legally trade on the basis of its own articles. \u201cThis is why it\u2019s not a confidence issue,\u201d Bainbridge told me. \u201cSurely if The WSJ were allowed to trade, this would shake investor confidence even more [than if Winans were].\u201d<\/p>\n But if insider trading represents a sort of theft from a client or employer, it raises something of a conundrum: members of Congress don\u2019t really have an employer. The law professor Donna Nagy has argued that they have a fiduciary duty to U.S. citizens, which they violate if they participate in insider trades. Ethically, this seems to be certainly true. But legally, Bainbridge thinks it\u2019s a little more murky. He believes that members of Congress are effectively fiduciaries of no one. \u201cThere\u2019s at least a strong argument,\u201d he says, \u201cthat congressional insider trading is not illegal under current law.\u201d<\/p>\n Certainly, the guardians of our laws don\u2019t seem eager to pursue the question. No member of Congress has ever been investigated for insider trading. Four times since 2006, Congresswoman Louise Slaughter (D\u2013New York) has sponsored the STOCK Act, which would explicitly make congressional insider trading illegal, and require members of Congress to disclose significant trades within 90 days. It\u2019s never even come to a vote.<\/p>\n If we can\u2019t require members of Congress to report their transactions in real time, the way corporate insiders have to\u2014and we can\u2019t\u2014then maybe they should have to put their holdings in a blind trust, as executive-branch officials like the Treasury secretary often must. Or at least in index funds that mirror the broad market, so that their fortunes rise and fall along with the contents of our 401(k)s. This requirement would curb the related temptation to use legislation to help companies they\u2019re invested in, which must at least occasionally plague even the most honorable legislators.<\/p>\n Otherwise, given the weakness of the oversight, Americans will continue to suspect the worst. One reason that the findings of Ziobrowski et al. may not have triggered much response is that everyone already believed their legislators were crooks\u2014morally, if not legally. And that\u2019s corrosive. In the end, the problem with congressional insider trading isn\u2019t that it undermines confidence in the market\u2014Congress frequently does that openly. The problem with congressional insider trading is that it erodes confidence in our political institutions. We can\u2019t really afford to deplete that pitiful stock much further.<\/p>\n Charming quote:<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n “The problem with quotes on the Internet is that it is hard to verify their authenticity.” — -Abraham Lincoln<\/p>\n Another reason to hate Microsoft.<\/strong><\/span> Sometimes the “find” function doesn’t work on my Excel 2003. I searched Microsoft’s support sites for help. I found this charming sentence: “Microsoft has confirmed that this is a problem in Excel 2003.<\/em>” That’s it. No solution. No workaround. No nothing. Amazing. This is on http:\/\/support.microsoft.com\/kb\/813978<\/strong><\/a><\/p>\n![\"\"](\"https:\/\/www.technologyinvestor.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2011\/10\/NowheretoHide.jpg\" "\\"NowheretoHide\\"")
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\nThe view from Doctor Doom<\/strong><\/p>\n
\nInvestors have had a dreadful time in the recent past. The immediate future looks pretty rotten, too<\/strong><\/em><\/p>\n<\/a><\/p>\n<\/a><\/p>\n<\/a><\/p>\n
\nAre members of Congress guilty of insider trading\u2014and does it matter? By Megan McArdle<\/p>\n<\/a><\/p>\n